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STOP AND FRISK: THE POWER AND TBE OBLIGATION OF THE POLICE
On June 10, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the case of Terry v. Ohio, rendered a
decision that will greatly aid the police in their
efforts to prevent crime and apprehend criminals.
That decision, however, must not be interpreted by
the police as a green light for indiscriminate,
arbitrary stopping and frisking, or for any other
unworthy purpose.
Americans for Eective Law Enforcement, Inc., a
non-partisan, non-political, not-for-profit educational corporation, which was founded last Summer
for the purpose of advancing the cause of effective
law enforcement, fled an "amicus curiae" (friend
of the Court) brief in the Terry case last November.
It urged the Court to rule as it did.
Upon the reasonable assumption that our brief
had a persuasive effect upon the Supreme Court,
we feel privileged to now admonish the police to
assume the proper responsibility that must accompany this privilege so newly sanctioned by the
Court.
The Terry decision only authorizes action upon
reasonable suspicion of criminality and a frisking
reasonably necessary for the officer's protection.
And all this must be performed in a reasonable
manner.
The Court's opinion sets up general guidelines
for the police. The actual holding of the case, however, indicates that the Court intended to confine
the power to "stop" to situations which clearly
call for investigation of criminally suspicious
circumstances and the power of "frisk" to situations where there is a probability that the person
to be frisked or searched is armed and may be
dangerous to the officer or other citizens. The
Court said:
". . . where a police officer observes unusual conduct
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that

the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous; where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman
and makes reasonable inquiries; and where nothing in
the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the
area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they
were taken."
Of course, the decision is not limited to the kind
of facts set out in the Terry case. It encompasses a
variety of suspicious conduct which the police
meet every day during the course of field investigation and interrogation. For this reason, police
training schools and police legal advisors must
relay the message of the Court in meaningful
terms to the police officer, with the use of appropriate examples of what is and what is not reasonable
action in stop and frisk situations. Reference to the
Court's holding, however, makes it unmistakably
dear that the Court will not tolerate "dragnet"
seizures and frisks which, though designed to
achieve ostensibly worthy objectives, e.g., gun
control or harassment of vice offenders and juvenile gangs, do not measure up to the Fourth
Amendment requirement of reasonableness.
By its decision in the Terry case, the Supreme
Court delivered into the hands of the police a very
powerful weapon for the prevention and detection
of crime. This power, however, is readily subject
to abuse by an ignorant, brutal, or corrupt police
officer. And any abuse of the power may easily lead
to deterioration of police-citizen relationship,
especially in the tense and emotionally charged
slum areas of our large cities. All measures neces-

STOP AND FRISK
sary to prevent this abuse must be taken by those
in command positions within the police force itself.
AELE is proud of the effort it made in the Terry
case to persuade the Supreme Court to uphold the
right of the police to "stop and frisk." In our
brief we pledged the Court that law enforcement
agencies would not abuse the power we requested
the Court to sanction. We now ask that the police
of this country make good our word, and that they
proceed to exercise their newly won legitimate
power with tolerance, understanding, tact, and
caution. What the Supreme Court has granted, the
legislatures can take away upon evidence of police
abuse of that power.

How well the police use the power may play an
important part in future cases coming before the
courts in which they are asked to rule in favor of
the needs of law enforcement. This factor may also
shape the course of events in the halls of Congress
and before other legislative bodies whenever proposals are under consideration for additional grants
of police powers.
We urge the police to use well and fairly the
power they now clearly have, for the protection
and preservation of the rights of all citizens.
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